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Abstract 
 
One of the biggest issues currently plaguing many advanced industrialized countries is the 
persistence of low fertility rates.  Decreasing fertility rates threaten economic growth, 
while government budgets have to accommodate more pension and health services as the 
number  of  adults  of  working  age  who  contribute  to  older  generations’  pensions 
diminishes.  I examine the determinants of fertility levels at the national level of seventeen 
OECD countries.  Specifically, I perform a pooled time series analysis covering the time 
period 1990-1999.  The analysis yields evidence that the types of state policies—active 
labor market programs, family-friendly policies, and employment protection laws—play 
a significant role in either helping or hindering fertility levels.  I find that Active Labor 
Market Policies and generous work and family policies encourage higher fertility rates, 
while the presence of Employment Protection Legislation—rules concerning hiring and 
firing—hinders the growth of fertility rates.   
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Introduction 
 
One of the biggest issues currently plaguing many advanced industrial countries is 
the persistence of low fertility rates.  In the European Union (EU), all Member States but 
Ireland have a fertility rate below 2.1, the rate necessary to replace the current population 
(Jenson,  2006).  In  2001,  the  fertility  rate  of  the EU  25  (including  the additional  ten 
member states that would join the EU in 2004) was 1.46, while the range in the EU 15 
(the fifteen member countries prior to enlargement in 2004) was from 1.89 (Ireland and 
France) to 1.22 (Spain; Jenson, 2006). Today’s figures reflect only slight increases in 
some countries, with continued widespread systemically low fertility.  The dilemma of 
low  fertility  stems  from  concern  that  the  EU’s  future—its  very  quality  of  life—is 
menaced by a failure of the population to replace itself.  Decreasing fertility rates threaten 
economic growth, while government budgets face the possibility of accommodating more 
pension and health services, as the number of adults of working age who contribute to 
older  generations’  pensions—let  alone  who  can  provide  care  and  support  for  older 
people—diminishes.   
For these reasons, I examine the determinants of fertility levels at the national 
level of seventeen OECD countries.  Specifically, I perform a pooled time series analysis 
using country-years as the unit of analysis, covering the time period 1990-1999.  The 
analysis yields evidence that the types of state policies—active labor market programs,   2 
family-friendly  policies,  and  employment  protection  laws—play  a  significant  role  in 
either helping or hindering fertility levels.  I find that Active Labor Market Policies and 
generous work and family policies encourage higher fertility rates, while the presence of 
Employment Protection Legislation—largely, rules concerning hiring and firing—hinders 
the growth of fertility rates.  The paper presents compelling evidence for differentiating 
between  types  of  policies  that  either  help  or  hinder  population growth  in  advanced 
industrialized countries. 
  In addressing the issue of low fertility in Europe, we are inevitably confronted with 
a combination of institutional and human factors: while governments can attempt to put 
into place institutions and policies that will encourage childbirth (such as subsidies for 
children,  family  leave  policies,  and  day  care  facilities),  population  reproduction  is 
fundamentally a micro-level decision.   The bottom line is  that  women and men must 
choose  to have children; no number of institutional configurations  will by  themselves 
result  in  the  birth  of  babies.    Rather,  it  is  the  combination  of  systems  of  welfare 
provision, people’s ability to provide for their wellbeing, and the choice of women and 
men to conceive children, that will likely result in increased fertility rates across Europe.    
    
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
  We are confronted with the question of just what encourages a rise in fertility levels, 
and  why  we  have  seen  a  drop  in  birthrates  in  the  first  place.  Until  the  women’s 
movement gained momentum in  the  1970s,  the  dominant  institutional  family  form in 
advanced  industrial  countries  was  the  ‘male  breadwinner  model’,  in  which  the  man 
maintains outside employment while the woman’s domain was in the home, caring for 
children and performing household tasks like cleaning, cooking, and the like. This family 
model  was  premised  on  the  notion  that  there  was  a  natural  societal  differentiation 
between men and women that required the man to be the provider and protector, and the 
woman to be the caregiver and reproducer. The male breadwinner model dominated the 
high  fertility  period  of  the  baby-boom  era,  in  which  women’s  roles  were  relegated 
primarily to rearing children and maintaining the home. Given little alternative, it is not 
difficult to see why women would bear multiple children: this was their ‘job’.  
  In  the  current  era,  different  societal  institutions  have  distanced  themselves 
successfully  from  the  male  breadwinner  model  and  have  moved  in  the  direction  of 
increased gender equity. Of course, some of the changes witnessed in post-1970s Europe 
stemmed not solely from a noble quest for gender egalitarianism, but also from the fact 
that,  for  many  people—women  and  men  alike—employment  became  an  economic 
necessity, rather than purely a matter of desire. New social pressures emerged as unions   4 
lost  power,  family  wages  dwindled,  living  standards  stagnated,  and  family  forms 
confronted instability, leading people to adapt to the changing constraints of the day.  
  In today’s world, especially in the realms of education and employment, the male 
breadwinner  model  is  largely  defunct:  in  most  advanced  industrial  countries,  women 
receive  higher  education  in  equal,  if  not  greater,  percentages  than  men,  and  through 
initiatives  like  equal  employment  opportunity  legislation,  women  suffer  less 
discrimination in employment selection today than in previous eras (McDonald, 2000). 
No longer limited to strict roles of ‘housewife’ or ‘breadwinner’, women and men alike 
embody more diversity in their joint roles in the family and workplace. However, with 
increased gender equity comes the challenge of balancing work and family life—a challenge 
which, as one hypothesis goes, may limit women’s real choices between children and 
employment, leading to low fertility (Esping-Andersen, 2002; McDonald, 2000). In other 
words, women may have gained ‘false’ gender equity in that while they may occupy more 
equitable roles with men in the public sphere, in the private sphere—i.e. life at home—
they are faced with family roles that continue to constrain their choices. 
Furthermore, the structure of the family has changed over the decades. By the 
1990s  across  Europe,  marriage  rates  were low  and/or  declining,  the  mean age at  first 
marriage and at first birth increased, and fertility dropped below the replacement rate of 
2.1 (Council of Europe, 2002). Demographers distinguish between three levels of below-
replacement fertility: 1) low fertility: at least 1.5 children per woman; 2) very low fertility: 
between  1.3  and  1.5  children  per  woman;  and  3)  lowest  low  fertility:  fewer  than  1.3 
children per woman (Billari and Kohler, 2004; Kohler et al., 2002). We witness varying   5 
low levels of fertility across Europe, ranging from southern, central, and eastern Europe 
and  Germany  at  the  lowest  end  of  the  fertility  spectrum,  to  the  medium-range  (e.g. 
Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland),  to  highest  fertility  levels  (e.g.  the  Nordic 
countries, France, Ireland, the UK). 
  Examining fertility rates has yielded some clarification on the relationship between 
levels  of  religiosity  and  fertility,  and  women’s  labor  force  participation  and  fertility. 
Countries with higher levels of religiosity and traditional (Catholic) family values, e.g. 
Spain and Italy, are in fact among the lowest fertility group (Billari, 2004). Moreover, the 
cross-country  relationship  between  female  participation  rates  and  fertility  rates  has 
reversed  its  sign;  the  correlation  between  total  fertility  rates  (TFR)  and  female 
participation rates (FPR) across developed countries was negative and strongly significant 
during the 1970s up to the early 1980s (Ahn and Mira, 2002). However, beginning in the 
mid- to late 1980s, the correlation became positive and equally significant. That is, as 
more women became gainfully employed, levels of fertility declined less. Several scholars 
(Ahn and Mira, 2002; Hotz et al., 1997; Rindfuss and Brewster, 1996) have posited a 
weakening link between female employment and fertility due to increased use of market 
childcare and the rising income effect of wages at high levels of the female wage.  
 
Gendering the welfare state dimension 
 
Although gender and the family were dimensions that were conspicuously absent 
from earlier welfare policy regime analyses of the 1980s (Orloff, 1993), current theorizing   6 
about  the  welfare  state  recognizes  the  significance  of  relationships  between  states, 
markets, and families, and the impact of these on society (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; 
Korpi, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Furthermore, analyses focusing on the ability of 
women to combine parenting and paid work have sought to evaluate how different welfare 
states either enhance or limit women’s opportunities in this regard (Gornick and Meyers, 
2003; Gornick et al., 1997).  
Gender equity and the reversal in the 1980s of the negative relationship between 
female  labor  force  participation  and  fertility  levels—at  the  national  level—became  a 
source of great interest in the academic world (Rindfuss et al., 2003; Ahn and Mira, 2002; 
Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000). According to McDonald (2000), the transition from higher 
fertility  (above  2.1)  to  fertility  merely  at  the  replacement  level  follows  from greater 
equality  shared  between men and  women in  families.  Gender  equity  promotes  lower 
fertility  by increasing the likelihood that  women will have more alternatives  to child-
rearing,  thus  securing  for  themselves  alternative  avenues  to  success,  satisfaction,  and 
position in society.  
Put another way, evolution of gender roles has increased the opportunity costs of 
mothers’ choices to refrain from entering the labor market: this is a point on which social 
demographers and economists agree, and for which substantial empirical evidence exists 
(Morgan  and  Taylor,  2006).  However,  as  gender  equity  rises  in  individual-oriented 
institutions (i.e. education,  the economy,  politics), it may  still remain low  within  the 
family or in policies aimed at impacting families (i.e. parental leave policies). As a result, 
fertility can fall to very low levels, especially among societies that are characterized as   7 
being more  patriarchal  than  others,  i.e.  Japan,  Italy, Spain,  while remaining closer  to 
replacement  levels  in  more  gender-egalitarian  societies,  i.e.  Scandinavia  and  the  U.S. 
(Rindfuss et al., 2003; Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997).  
Rindfuss et al. (2003) find that the relationship between fertility rates and female 
labor force participation varies across countries, with those countries that minimize the 
incompatibility between mother and work roles—i.e. facilitate the efforts of women who 
want to fill both roles—being more likely to see increasing numbers of working mothers. 
Countries in this group are likely to have higher proportions of females who are both 
employed and mothers, because women can more easily combine these two roles, than 
countries that do little to minimize the role incompatibility. As Esping-Andersen (1990, 
1999) and others have pointed out, the institutions and policies of the three ‘worlds’ of 
welfare states vary markedly, with the Nordic countries most able to offer women the 
opportunity to combine work, both part-time and full-time, and motherhood, followed in 
various rankings by ‘Continental European’ and Anglo-Saxon countries, with Southern 
European countries representing some of the lowest fertility rates.  
Esping-Andersen  (1999)  identifies  the  employment/parenting  relationship  as 
embodying a certain ‘risk’, which stands for the degree to which a person is dependent on 
the family or a job for his or her welfare. Where the state absorbs risks—i.e. provides 
unemployment  insurance  and/or  benefits,  or  subsidizes  childcare—the  attainment  of 
people’s needs is both ‘de-commodified’ (removed from the market) and ‘de-familialized’ 
(removed from the family). Similarly, the label ‘familialistic’ denotes a designation of a 
maximum  of  welfare  obligations  to  the  household;  in  the  same  vein,  the  term  ‘de-  8 
familialization’ represents policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family.  
Contemporary postindustrial society is characterized not by the stable one-earner 
family that was once considered typical, but rather by an increase in cohabitation and 
single-person households, dual-earner families, single parenthood, separation and divorce, 
and decreasing fertility. De-familialization for women is generally a precondition for their 
capacity to enter the labor market (Orloff, 1993). The burden on women of household 
maintenance and caring for children and/or elders needs to be lessened in order for them to 
be able to enter the marketplace and maintain employment. The most familialistic regimes, 
such as Italy and Spain, have the least developed family policies; familialism encourages a 
passive family policy due mostly to the influence of Catholic social teachings and the 
principle of subsidiarity—that is, limiting public interference to situations where primary 
social networks (i.e. the family) fail (Esping-Andersen, 1999). These structural aspects—
along with norms and conceptions of women’s and men’s roles and identities—constrain 
and  channel  behavior,  and  are  presumed  to  affect  national  fertility  levels.  ‘Structural 
aspects’  include  family  structure,  childcare  provision,  consumer  markets,  government 
policies, fiscal incentives, etc. (Morgan and Taylor, 2006).  
 
What Matters at the Individual Level 
 
We  know  that  the  relationship  between  female  labor  force  participation  and 
fertility is negative at the individual level, due to the fact that women who are employed 
have fewer children, on average, than women who are not, and that women with children   9 
spend less time in paid employment, on average, than women without children (Brewster 
and  Rindfuss  2000).    Thus  we  are  presented  with  the  important  question  of  how  a 
negative relationship  between  fertility  and  employment  at  the individual level can  be 
translated into a positive relationship at the aggregate level.   
Studies have shown that women’s work patterns are strongly tied to changes in 
their  family  status,  with  most  employed  women  leaving  paid  work  for  some  time 
following a birth (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  The duration of this leave from work 
varies among women and across countries, depending on leave policies, fiscal incentives, 
and childcare availability.  In Japan and Ireland, for example, where cultural  practices 
prescribe intensive maternal involvement in children’s care, new mothers typically leave 
the workforce for prolonged periods, averaging a decade or more (Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000).  Women in Germany likewise tend to exit the labor force for extended periods 
following a birth, due to fiscal incentives to do so, a pronounced shortage of childcare, and 
school-day  schedules  that vary by  the age of  the child and often do not conform  to 
workday schedules (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  However, in the United States and the 
Nordic countries, the labor force participation rates of new mothers and mothers with 
preschool-age children are relatively high, although most women in these countries take 
some amount of leave (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  The Nordic countries provide an 
example of the most progressive leaves: employers must offer paid leave to new mothers 
and  new  fathers,  with  leave  lasting  from  four  months  to  approximately  one  year 
(Ellingsaeter  and  Rønsen  1996,  Bernhardt  1986  in  Brewster  and  Rindfuss  2000).  
Maternal leaves in the United States average about twenty weeks and are usually unpaid;   10 
moreover, the rate of return is rapid, with 40% of women returning to work within three 
months and 86% returning within a year (Desai and Waite 1991).      
On an individual level, the potential incompatibility of work and motherhood may 
be a function of existing gender norms in society and power relations—or roles—within 
marriage or couplehood.  Countries in which traditional gender patterns have changed to 
allow  more  equality  between  the  sexes  are  more  likely  to  have  organized  childcare 
facilities  and  other  provisions  that  facilitate  the  combination  of  employment  and 
parenthood  (Bernhardt  1993).    Modification  of gender  roles  can  also  be  seen  in  the 
tendency for men to figure more actively in parenting, not simply in economic terms, but 
in devoting more time to the care of the child, thus allowing both parents to have a more 
equal share of time to devote to both work and childcare.  The expectation is that the 
more  egalitarian  men’s  and  women’s  roles  in  the  household  and  raising  children,  the 
greater the likelihood of more children (or at least, the possibility to have children). 
One mechanism for transforming the negative relationship between fertility and 
women’s employment into a positive one focuses on the role of institutions in mediating 
what can be seen as the “incompatibility factor” between paid work and motherhood.  
Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) suggest that “the negative association between fertility and 
labor force participation can be expected to diminish as the conflict between work and 
family responsibilities is reduced—whether by a change in the nature of work life, shifts 
in  the  social  organization  of  childcare,  or a combination  of  the  two”  (p.  262).    This 
argument is in line with Esping-Andersen (1999) and others who highlight the role of 
institutions in mitigating the role incompatibility of  parenting and participation in the   11 
labor force. 
 
Aggregate-Level Indicators 
 
One mitigating mechanism exhibited by  the state is family  policy, designed to 
regulate social and economic relations  within families as  well as between families and 
other  social  institutions  (Wennemo  1993;  Brewster  and  Rindfuss  2000).    The  term 
“family  policy”  encompasses  myriad  debatable  goals  ranging  from  ensuring  equitable 
living  standards  to  actively  encouraging  larger  family  sizes.    And  while  all  advanced 
industrial nations allow some form of provision for working families, states’ positions on 
families and family policies differ markedly (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  Similarly to 
Esping-Andersen’s  (1990)  clustering  of  welfare-state  regimes  into  three  “worlds,” 
Chesnais (1996)  proposes a conceptual mechanism for distinguishing between family-
oriented state policies across Europe.  He defines “nations of families” as including those 
in  which  the  extended  family  is  at  the center  of  key  life  decisions  (i.e. marriage and 
childbearing) and in which family networks are usually responsible for providing family 
services.  In contrast, “nations of individuals” embody a strong notion of individualism 
and  social  equality.    In  the  “nations  of  families,”  policies  either  support  the  “male 
breadwinner” model, as in Germany where the protection of the family as a key pillar of 
society is formally upheld in the 1949 Basic Law, or they simply do not intervene in the 
family  realm,  as  in  Italy  (Chesnais  1996).    “Nations  of  individuals”  like  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Sweden,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  have  policies  that  more  actively   12 
promote women’s equality and acknowledge diverse family forms.    
Childcare  arrangements  are  another  factor  that  influence  women’s  ability  to 
reconcile family duties and participation in the labor force.  According to Rindfuss and 
Brewster (1996), norms and attitudes about childcare directly relate to the concept of role 
incompatibility.  The incompatibility between women’s roles as mothers and employees 
varies depending on beliefs about appropriate caregivers and about  the ages at  which 
children require close supervision.  The higher degree of maternal supervision that norms 
prescribe,  argue  the  authors,  the  greater  the  role  incompatibility  and,  therefore,  the 
stronger the negative relationship between fertility and women’s labor force participation.   
The availability of childcare also figures in the picture, as does its cost.  In most 
European countries, childcare is at least partly publicly funded for children age three and 
older (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).   For example, in Sweden and Finland,  the  state 
subsidizes childcare and parents pay a nominal fee, depending on income, for childcare in 
state-licensed centers or family daycare homes (Mikkola 1991; Sundstrom 1991).  France 
has a combination of private and public childcare providers, all of which receive some 
state subsidies, with the percentage of the cost that parents pay varying from 28% to 
90% depending on  provider  type (David and Starzec 1991).  In  the English-speaking 
countries, by contrast, most childcare is not subsidized, leaving people to pay market 
costs and rely on private means for childcare provision. 
The  underlying  assumption  of  role  incompatibility  between  labor  force 
participation and childrearing is that women will adjust either one to accommodate for the 
other.  In fact, however, the evidence suggests that women adjust both factors, and that   13 
the degree to which they do this varies across countries (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
Because labor force participation and fertility are more accurately conceived as processes 
that develop over time rather than as static events, we must conceptualize the fertility-
employment relationship as a dynamic model (Bernhardt 1993; Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000).  That is, individuals may enter, exit, and re-enter the workforce at any point, just 
as fertility decisions, both the number and timing of births, are also fluid over time as 
circumstances change.   
     
 
Hypotheses 
 
Active Labor Market Policies 
 
Table 1 shows descriptions of the variables in the analysis and their hypothesized 
effects on fertility level.  Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) retrain and reintegrate 
unemployed workers into the labor force.  The use of active labor market programs is 
often motivated by the need to upgrade the skills of long-term unemployed in order to 
improve  their employability.   These  policies, which constitute an active approach  to 
putting people back into the workforce, should have positive impact on employment (and 
thus  income)  by  increasing  the  employability  of  the  working-age  population.  
Furthermore, ALMP help absorb unemployed  youth in either education or sponsored 
employment.  The labor market policies play a vital role in lessening the consequences of 
youth unemployment in Nordic countries: in these countries, 2-2.5 percent of the youth 
labor force is in active labor market programs, compared to a Continental European  
average of 1.2 percent.  Similarly, more than 6 percent of the Scandinavian labor force is in 
labor market training schemes, compared to 2.3 percent in Continental Europe (Esping-
Andersen  1999).    Thus  I  hypothesize  that greater  spending on  ALMP  will  yield an 
increase in fertility through creating a more secure and prosperous financial outlook for 
both  men  and  women  and  easing  their  reintegration  into  the  workforce.    ALMP  are   15 
especially  critical  in  reintegrating  youth  into  the  workforce,  thereby  reducing  the 
detrimental effect of delayed family formation due to young people remaining longer with  
their parents (Esping-Andersen 1999). 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
 
  Some form of employment protection legislation (EPL) can be found in nearly every 
OECD country, although significant cross-national differences exist in the breadth and 
strictness of these measures (see OECD 1999), and the overall effects produced by these 
policies remain disputed.  EPL refers in general  to regulations about hiring (e.g. rules 
favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, 
training  requirements)  and  firing  (e.g.  redundancy  procedures,  mandated  notification 
periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-
time work schemes).  In countries with strict job protection laws and various restrictions 
on  temporary  and  part-time  work,  a  dual labor market  emerges in  which  “outsiders” 
(those  without  stable  employment)  face  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  secure  positions 
enjoyed by “insiders.”  The high-EPL model of privileging the core workforce yields this 
insider/outsider divide: the high wages and job security enjoyed by chiefly male insiders is 
predicated in effect on the exclusion of youth and women (Esping-Andersen 1999).   
  While there have not been many studies on the effect of employment protection 
policies on fertility, it is generally agreed that stricter employment protection laws inhibit 
employment among youth and outsiders who are left out of protected labor schemes, and   16 
propagate  the  insider/outsider  divide  (Rueda,  2005).  The  implications  of  this 
insider/outsider divide for fertility stem from the fact that in countries with high levels of 
employment protection rigidities, young people live longer with their parents, and as a 
result, are likely to delay childbirth and other life developments (Fogli, 2004).  
  Furthermore, flexible labor legislation and widely available part-time employment 
aid the dual role of parent and worker. Rigid labor regulations that favor the full-time 
male employee in European countries—most notably in Southern Europe—hinder part-
time employment (Adsera, 2005). As more women enter the workforce, labor market 
institutions need to be adapted to accommodate flexibility in employment arrangements, 
in order to ease the combination of employment and motherhood. Rigid labor market 
institutions  designed  to  protect  mature  male  workers  have  produced  higher  female 
unemployment  rates,  in  addition  to  lower  fertility  (ibid.).  Bertola  et  al.  (2002)  have 
shown that in countries with high levels of employment protection, increased activity in 
temporary  and  informal  employment  has  hampered  women’s  long-term  labor  force 
involvement, and thus hinders long-term family planning. 
Therefore,  higher  levels  of  EPL  result  in  delayed  family  formation,  as  young 
people  live  for  a  longer  period  of  time  with  their  parents  while  waiting  to  secure 
employment and women are prone to labor market exclusion. This expectation is best 
captured when evaluated through the insider/outsider lens: the higher the EPL, and thus 
the ratio of outsiders to insiders in the labor force, the lower will be the fertility level, 
since especially youth and women under these conditions have difficulty finding secure 
jobs.  As a result,  people have fewer children than they would like to (Jenson 2006; 
Chesnais 1996).  EPL discourages women from having children because it results in an   17 
“either/or”  situation:  where  conditions  are  unfavorable  for  combining  work  and 
parenthood, women will choose either one or the other.  I hypothesize that the stronger 
the presence of EPL in a country, the lower the fertility level. 
 
Unemployment 
   
  The higher the level of unemployment, the more people’s financial outlooks are not 
stable.  Thus, my hypothesis is that greater unemployment will result in lower fertility as 
people are faced with insecure financial prospects and cannot provide financially for their 
families.   
 
Youth unemployment 
   
  The percentage of unemployed youth is another expression of the insider/outsider 
divide.    A  low-fertility  equilibrium may  concretize  when  combined  with  factors  that 
hinder family formation, one of which is youth unemployment (Esping-Andersen 1999).  
The problem arises when youth do not have alternative means of income and therefore 
delay  family  formation  while  they  are  seeking  employment.    In  familialistic  welfare 
regimes, economic support for children is a family obligation.  In Southern Europe, young 
adults continue to live with their parents until and even beyond age 30; estimates from the 
1994 Europanel show that the proportion of 20-30-year-old unemployed Italian youth 
living  with  parents  is  81  percent  (Esping-Andersen  1999).    Thus  we  have  reason  to   18 
hypothesize that high youth unemployment will be negatively correlated with fertility 
levels, as  young  people delay family formation due  to  their exclusion from  the labor 
market. 
 
Family Policies 
   
  The ability of women and men to combine paid work and parenthood rests arguably 
on the degree to which measures exist to ease the financial burden of raising a family and 
ease  time  constraints  of  raising  children  while  attempting  to  maintain  employment.  
Where social and economic institutions have adapted more rapidly to the gender equity 
model  (away  from  the  emphasis  on  the  male  breadwinner  model),  as  in  the  Nordic 
countries  and  in  France,  fertility  has  not  fallen  to  dire,  low  levels.    Conversely,  in 
countries  where  attitudes  toward  the  family  have  mirrored  the  male  breadwinner 
perspective—that is,  where employment for mothers faces restrictions due  to lack of 
family  support  services  (i.e.  childcare)  and  where  societal  arrangements  increase  the 
difficulty of combining work and parenthood (i.e. parental leave conditions), fertility rates 
have  plummeted  (McDonald  2000).    Thus,  we  hypothesize  a  positive  relationship 
between both government spending on daycare services and fertility levels, and between 
parental leave duration/benefits and fertility levels. 
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Welfare State Regime Types 
   
  Table 2 shows the mean values of the key indicators and dependent variable, broken 
down by country and welfare regime type.  Empirically, we observe two different paths 
to higher fertility:  the Liberal welfare state  path and the Social Democratic one.  The 
Nordic  countries  have  generous  work/family  policies  and  ALMP  and  moderate  EPL 
levels.  Conversely, the Liberal path has weak family policies, ALMP, and EPL.  We see 
from Table 2 that the values of the independent variables accounting for higher or lower 
fertility vary by regime type.  Thus, these data show the relationship between welfare 
regime type and fertility level, which we can then compare with what we learn about 
specific independent variables from our analysis. 
 
  
 
Measurement of Variables 
 
  The analysis covers the period 1990-1999 for 17 advanced industrial countries.  The 
main  data  sources  are  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  and  Gauthier  and  Bortnik’s  (2001)  Comparative  Maternity,  Parental,  and 
Childcare database.  The dependent variable in the analysis is the fertility rate, or total 
births per woman, taken from the World Bank. 
Data on employment protection legislation (EPL) are the OECD’s (2004) recently 
released annual  time  series.    The  summary  index  summarizes  a  number  of  subindices 
measuring the difficulty of layoff (notice, severance pay, etc.) and regulations restricting 
the use of temporary work (Bradley and Stephens 2007).  This index is calculated along 
18 basic items, which can be classified in three main areas: 1) employment protection of 
regular  workers  against  individual  dismissal;  2)  specific  requirements  for  collective 
dismissals; and 3) regulation of temporary forms of employment.  Active Labor Market 
Policy (ALMP) effort is operationalized as active labor market spending as a percentage 
of GDP divided by the unemployed portion of the population.   
  The  variables  measuring  parental  leave  and  benefits  come  from  Gauthier  and 
Bortnik’s (2001) dataset.   The summary variable that I use  to capture  parental leave 
generosity  is  the  average  replacement  rate  for  52  weeks,  which  is  calculated  from 
maternity/parental  leave  duration  (in  weeks)  and  maternity/parental  leave  benefits   21 
(expressed as a percentage of women’s wages in manufacturing).  Where the leave period 
was more than one year, as in Finland in 1991-1992 and in Sweden 1990-1999 (54 and 64 
weeks, respectively), the replacement rate was recalibrated to fit a scale of 52 weeks. The 
variable measuring daycare spending as a  percentage of GDP is drawn from both  the 
OECD and Jaumotte series on daycare spending.  Based on Gornick and Meyers, Chapter 
7, I use Jaumotte for Belgium and and Norway because OECD appears to be too low, as 
well as for Canada, for which OECD had no data.  For the UK and France, I use OECD 
and fill in missing data from Jaumotte.  For the U.S., Jaumotte is used with reservations.  
Based on Gornick and Meyers, Jaumotte appears to be too high but OECD appears to be 
much too low.  Finally, I use a composite variable capturing work and family  policy 
generosity,  which  is  a  combination  of  the  standardized  maternity/parental generosity 
variable and the standardized daycare spending variable.  I use this composite variable 
because we cannot put both parental leave and daycare variables into the regressions at 
the same time, due to the problem of multicollinearity (correlation = .89).  Therefore, I 
have three separate models using daycare spending, parental leave, and the composite 
work and family policy variables, respectively.  
  The youth unemployment variable is the rate of total youth unemployment, age 15-
24, taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).  Overall unemployment 
rate is taken from OECD.  Under the theoretical premise that a given year’s fertility rate 
is not a function of the effect of the economic cycle of that same year, but rather reflects 
cumulative economic effects, I take the average of the previous five years of economic 
indicators:  unemployment  rate  (both  total  and  youth)  and  employment  protection   22 
legislation.   My argument is  that the broader economic picture—whether favorable or 
disadvantageous—influences  people’s  decisions  to  have  a  child  or  not.    When 
unemployment is high, people’s economic outlooks are shaky, thus reflecting an unstable 
financial environment in which to have children.  Moreover, as EPL policies have been in 
effect  over  several  years,  the  insider/outsider  dimensions  of  the labor market  become 
entrenched; if a person has been on the “outside” economically for the past several years, 
he/she will be less inclined to perceive him-/herself in a position to raise a child and will be 
in a situation of delayed family formation. 
  
 
Analysis 
 
  I conduct a pooled time series analysis of the determinants of the fertility rate, the 
dependent variable, using panel-corrected standard errors and Prais Winsten regression 
estimation, corrections for first-order auto-regressiveness, and imposition of a common 
rho for all cross-sections across seventeen OECD countries from 1990-1999, with 
country-years as my unit of analysis. Hicks (1994) notes that "errors for regression 
equations estimated from pooled data using OLS [ordinary least squares regression] 
procedures tend to be (1) temporally autoregressive, (2) cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, 
and (3) cross-sectionally correlated as well as (4) conceal unit and period effects  and (5) 
reflect some causal heterogeneity across space, time, or both" (p.172).  Beck and Katz 
(2004:16-17) have shown that correcting for first order auto-regressiveness actually does 
include a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation (known as Prais 
Winsten estimations).  Thus, it deals with the problem of serial correlation that is found 
in pooled time series, but without suppressing the power of other independent variables.  
The analysis is implemented using version 9.1 of the STATA econometrics program. 
Beck  and  Katz  (1996)  and  others  have  argued  for  the  inclusion  of  country 
dummies in order to deal with omitted variable bias.  Plümper et al. (2005: 330-34) in 
their recent treatment of this issue have countered that inclusion of country dummies does 
much more than eliminate omitted variable bias.  It also (1) eliminates any variation in the   24 
dependent  variable  which  is  due  to  time  invariant  factors  such  as  difference  in 
constitutional structures, (2) greatly reduces the coefficients of factors that vary mainly 
between  countries,  (3)  eliminates  any  differences  in  the  dependent  variable  due  to 
differences at time t in the time series, and (4) completely absorb(s) differences in the level 
of  the  independent  variables  across  the  units  (p.331,  emphasis  in  the  original).  
Elaborating on this last point, they argue that if one hypothesizes that the level of the 
independent variable has an effect on the level of the dependent variables (e.g. the level of 
unemployment on the level of fertility) a fixed effects specification is not the appropriate 
model.  If a theory predicts level effects, one should not include unit dummies.  In these 
cases, allowing for a mild bias resulting from omitted variables is less harmful than running 
a  fixed  effects  specification  (p.  334).    I  hypothesize  effects  in  the  levels  of  the 
independent variables prior to time t on the level of the dependent variable at time t, and 
effects of levels of  the independent variables on levels of  the dependent variable.  In 
addition, variation in several of the independent variables, including the critical policy 
variables, is primarily cross-sectional.  Thus, it is clear that fixed effects estimation or the 
inclusion of country dummies is not appropriate in this case (cf. Huo, Nelson, Stephens 
2008).  
  
 
Results 
 
  Table 3 shows the results of the analyses, and Table 4 shows the overall effects of 
welfare regime type on fertility level.  As hypothesized, EPL has an inverse relationship 
with fertility levels: the higher the EPL, the lower the fertility.  This result corresponds to 
the expectation that as the number of outsiders to insiders increases, due to protection of 
the insiders’ jobs and exclusion of certain groups (women and youth in particular) from 
the labor market, fertility levels will drop, due to people’s concerns about their financial 
well-being and ensuing delayed family formation.  In all the models, EPL remains the most 
significant  variable  and  also  has  the  strongest  effect.    When  we  move  two  standard 
deviations on the measure of EPL, we get the biggest change in fertility rate: a decrease of 
.22.  The implications of this effect are substantial: if employment protection legislation 
remains as is, there will be no change in fertility level.  Only when legislation is modified 
to diminish the effects of the insider/outsider divide would we expect to see a positive 
change in the effect of EPL on people’s decisions to have children.   
The variable with the second-largest effect is  the composite  “work and family 
policy”  variable,  reflecting  the  positive  correlation  between  maternal/parental  leave 
policies and government daycare spending, and having children.  Moving two standard 
deviations yields a .15 increase in fertility rate; isolating the composite variable’s two   26 
components, leave generosity and daycare spending, yields an increase of .11 in fertility 
rate for each.  Thus we witness the hypothesized correlation with fertility level: the more 
parental benefits and childcare spending, the greater the fertility levels.   
Consistent  with  our  hypothesis,  ALMP  have  the  opposite  effect  of  EPL, 
providing support for the idea that policies promoting active engagement in the workforce 
and  retraining  of  the  unemployed  will  strengthen  overall  employment  (and  therefore 
people’s financial outlooks), create more opportunity for dual-earner families, and lead to 
higher fertility.   The size of  the effect of  ALMP is  significant: moving two  standard 
deviations yields an increase in fertility rate of .08.  
Perhaps  surprisingly,  overall  unemployment  is  not  significant  in  any  model.  
However, the unemployment variable captures average unemployment rates at any given 
point in time, and does not reflect the fact that different individuals will cycle in and out 
of employment at various points in their lives, and thus the degree to which their financial 
outlooks are bleak will vary.  In other words, the unemployment variable does not show 
cyclical effects on fertility.  France, Germany, Belgium, and other continental European 
countries have consistently high levels of unemployment, whereas the Nordic countries 
do not, but nonetheless, we cannot conclude that unemployment does not have some 
bearing on people’s choices to have children.  
Table  4  regresses  fertility  on  the  welfare  state  regime  dummy  variables.    The 
overall  variation  is  not  significantly  different  from  the  models  with  theoretically 
meaningful independent variables in Table 3.  This indicates that the variables in Table 3 
do, in fact, explain why the welfare state regimes differ in their fertility levels.   Conclusion 
   
  To  summarize,  this analysis offers  support for  the hypothesis  that government 
policies  can  and  do  affect  people’s  choices  to  have  children.    Active  Labor  Market 
Policies encourage retraining and reintegrating unemployed workers into the labor force, 
which in  turn  place more  potential and actual mothers  and  fathers  into  jobs,  earning 
income, and securing the financial means to raise children.  Welfare  regimes  that  enact 
active labor market  policies  to encourage employment are expected  to  produce higher 
fertility  levels,  since  the  potential  for  dual-earner  families  rises,  thus  providing  more 
money for financing childrearing.  For example, despite roughly similar levels of aggregate 
unemployment and similarly compressed wage structures in Continental Europe and the 
Nordic countries,  youth fare considerably better in the latter, due in large part  to the 
Nordic welfare system of emphasis on active labor market programs (Esping-Andersen 
1999).   
  Furthermore,  as  the  Nordic  countries  embody  a  more  gender-egalitarian  social 
system  and  Liberal  countries  witness  high  percentages  of  female  employment 
participation rates as compared with Continental countries, we witness an increase in 
fertility rate.  Active de-familialization of welfare burdens in the social democratic welfare 
states, a passive or targeted-assistance approach in the liberal regimes, and a system of 
sustained familialism in Continental Europe (especially in southern Europe) embody the   28 
differences in the profile and intensity of social risks within families (Esping-Andersen 
1999). 
Additionally, employment protection policies have a contradictory effect on some 
people’s financial well-being and choices to have children, and are correlated with lower 
fertility rates.  The longer young people remain unemployed and live with their parents—
an important dimension of the insider/outsider distinction—the longer they will wait to 
get  married  or  begin  independent  lives,  thus  leading  to  a  slowdown  in  fertility  rates 
stemming from delayed family formation.  The negative correlation between EPL and 
fertility rate reinforces the hypothesis that the insider/outsider dimension within the labor 
market—those  who have secure jobs, and  those  who do not—affects  whether or not 
people have children.  For those who consider themselves to be financially secure, having 
children seems to be a viable option, but for those who are left out of the labor market and 
find  it  difficult  to  attain  reliable  employment,  financial  futures  look  bleak,  and  thus 
potentially affect the choice to have children.   
  In another study (Nelson and Stephens 2008), ALMP, work/family policies, and 
EPL are shown as being important determinants of women’s labor force participation, 
with similar positive and negative effects as they have on fertility.  Since we see from the 
data that ALMP and work/family generosity yield an increase in both female employment 
and fertility,  we have evidence  that  these  policies bridge the work/parenthood divide.  
Policies that reduce the conflict between parenthood and employment will be likely to 
encourage higher fertility rates.  Family policies appear from this paper’s analysis to be 
crucial  in  promoting  an  environment  that  is  conducive  to  bearing  children,  through   29 
ensuring that employment-leave and childcare options exist, should people decide to have 
children.  Both government daycare spending and leave generosity were shown in this 
analysis to be positively and significantly correlated with an increase in fertility rate.   
The results show that there is not one magic cure-all as a solution to the work-
family-fertility nexus.  Rather, it is a combination of opportunities available to people to 
reconcile work and parenting, such as quality childcare, financial resources, and overall 
adequate standard of living.  These opportunities function in addition to values—valuing 
having children, but also valuing promoting equality between women and men and the 
attainment of their respective life goals.    
  Future research will need to identify the specific factors that people consider when 
deciding to have children, one mechanism for which will be to employ survey questions to 
this effect.  Furthermore, future research must consider the implications of policy design.  
Not all childcare is equally accessible, affordable or adequate; not all parental leaves, even 
if paid, provide the same level of support for  parental labor market  participation and 
access to quality jobs.  Moreover, as family structures change and marriage has become 
less traditional—e.g. many people now marry more than once in their lifetime, not all 
unions are between men and women, women have children as single mothers, and men and 
women alike wait longer to both get married and have their first child—policies aimed at 
reducing the work/family incompatibility will need to take these changes into account.   
The  21
st  century  promises  a  significant  challenge  if  fertility  levels  remain  at 
perilously low levels.  While increasing numbers of immigrants to OECD countries will 
ameliorate the problem of low fertility slightly because they will work and contribute to   30 
the  pension  system,  as  well  as  aid  in  increasing  the  population  by  having  children, 
immigration remains a politically contested subject.  Immigration can be viewed as one 
alternative—a complement to the problem of low fertility—but cannot be relied upon as 
the solution, for political and cultural reasons.  States must confront the challenge of low 
fertility while acknowledging modern family models and equality of opportunity, rather 
than looking backward to archaic family and demographic models of yesteryear.    
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Hypothesized Effects on Fertility Level
Variable Description Hypothesized Effect
Active Labor Market Policies
Spending on active labor market policy 
measures divided by the unemployed 
population +
Unemployment Level
Percentage of working-age population 
unemployed -
Youth unemployment Rate of youth unemployment, age 15-24 -
Employment protection Index of employment protection legislation -
Daycare spending Daycare spending as a percentage of GDP +
Leave generosity
Maternity/parental leave duration (in weeks) 
and leave benefits (as % of women's wages in 
manufacturing) +
Composite work and family 
policy
Combination of daycare spending and leave 
generosity +
Social Democratic welfare 
regimes
Nordic countries
+
Christian Democratic welfare 
regimes
Christian Dem. & Continental European 
countries -
Liberal welfare regimes Liberal market economies +  32 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mean Values of Variables by Country 
  Fertility 
rate 
Active Labor 
Market Policy 
Unemployment  Youth 
Unemployment 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Daycare 
Spending 
Maternity/
Parental 
Leave 
Work/
Family 
Policy 
Social Democratic Welfare States             
Denmark  1.74  0.22  7.65  12.97  2.12  1.85  53.69  3.89 
Finland  1.79  0.17  8.22  24.97  2.21  1.15  76.98  3.70 
Norway  1.87  0.20  4.10  13.64  2.86  1.40  71.92  3.93 
Sweden  1.84  0.56  4.54  15.71  3.08  1.73  92.43  5.21 
Mean  1.81  0.29  6.13  16.82  2.57  1.53  73.76  4.18 
Continental (Christian Democratic) Welfare States           
Austria  1.42  0.09  3.62  5.51  2.20  0.48  30.77  0.24 
Belgium  1.58  0.15  9.33  21.62  3.14  0.56  22.16  -0.07 
France  1.73  0.10  9.95  27.59  2.91  0.68  27.51  0.81 
Germany  1.31  0.18  6.70  10.03  3.13  0.34  26.92  -0.10 
Italy  1.23  0.04  9.32  38.47  3.57  0.10  33.08  -0.31 
Netherlands  1.58  0.21  7.08  13.76  2.70  0.40  28.46  -0.03 
Switzerland  1.51  0.22  1.77  6.54  1.10  0.14  0.00  -1.79 
Mean  1.48  0.14  6.82  17.65  2.68  0.39  24.13  -0.18 
Liberal Welfare States               
Australia  1.83  0.06  8.33  18.31  0.94  0.12  0.00  -1.76 
Canada  1.65  0.06  9.72  17.69  0.80  0.33  16.53  -0.70 
Ireland  1.95  0.11  14.39  25.65  0.90  0.08  18.85  -0.96 
United 
Kingdom 
1.76  0.07  9.46  16.95  0.60  0.13  15.58  -1.11 
United States  2.05  0.04  6.68  14.75  0.20  0.34  0.00  -1.38 
Mean  1.85  0.07  9.72  18.67  0.69  0.20  10.19  -1.18 
             
Japan  1.45  0.09  2.61  6.25  2.11  0.22  16.15  -0.87 
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Table 3: Prais-Winsten Models of Determinants of Fertility Levels  
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Active Labor Market Policies  0.261*  0.261**  0.245* 
  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Unemployment  0.000297  0.00106  -0.0000427 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Youth unemployment  -0.000664  -0.00237  -0.00158 
  (0.0043)  (0.0045)  (0.0044) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.108***  -0.102***  -0.109*** 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.027) 
Daycare spending  0.0946***     
  (0.032)     
Maternity/parental leave 
duration and leave benefits 
  0.00218**   
    (0.0010)   
Composite "work and family 
policy" variable 
    0.0326*** 
      (0.012) 
Constant  1.804***  1.808***  1.867*** 
  (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.072) 
N  150  153  150 
R
2  0.93  0.92  0.93 
Common Rho  .897  .931  .922 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Prais-Winsten Model of Fertility Level by Social Welfare Regime Type 
(Christian Democratic as baseline) 
Independent Variables  Model 1       
Social Democratic  .303***       
Liberal  .403***       
Constant  1.497***       
Common Rho  .90       
R
2  .94       
N  175       
***p=.001.         
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